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Do not regard the Roman Catholic mind as your enemy. In reality you are a part of that mind." Obviously, then, while Mr. Chapman sometimes goes quite as far in the direction of extreme assertion as a conscientious writer may permit himself to go without adducing detailed proof, he cannot be charged with narrowness or with unworthy motives.

In fact, the principal and perhaps the most important effect of the whole treatise is to compel a realization of the need of a larger religious consciousness, and in this sense its deepest criticism, after all, is aimed not at Catholics but at Protestants. We have been asleep, it appears, and it is now full time to awake. We must rouse ourselves from the nightmare of materialism or from the lethargic slumber of indifferent matter-of-factness. We must realize the historic significance of religion, its indestructibility and its present meaning. Yet in this awakening, this fresh realization, we must avoid the fundamental error of subordinating the whole to the part, the end to the instrument. "It is plain that any recipe which ensures piety—like any recipe which makes art easy—weakens piety or art." Moreover, we must not, as superficial thinkers do, fall foul of that profoundest of human paradoxes, the truth that while we are called upon for individual effort, nothing is done except by the will of God. "All things were made by Him and without Him was not anything made that was made." All progress, declares Mr. Chapman, has come "as the operation of God, and has gone forward apparently against the will of everybody." In religion, therefore, "if we will but allow God to do the work without setting up a machine of our own, it will be done wholesomely, and we ourselves shall become robust." On the whole, no more penetrating comments upon personal religion have been written in recent times than some of those contained in Mr. Chapman's *Notes*, and the treatise as a whole can hardly fail to broaden and deepen the reader's view of the tremendous question that is its theme.

WHAT MAY I HOPE? By George Trumbull Ladd. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1915.

Men are never through with the struggle to make plainer to themselves and to others the meanings of those originally hard-won distinctions between abstract ideas upon which reason, or "common sense," must rely for clearness of thought regarding those problems that come closest to the individual soul. Such words as *belief* and *knowledge*, *faith*, *hope* and *charity*, to say nothing of *beauty*, have never been fully or accurately defined. We have found, indeed, that all human "faculties" or activities tend in the last analysis to merge into one another as being aspects or energies of the same

mysterious self which is the undecomposable inner reality. Despite this realization (which has saved us in some degree from the error of merely debating about words, after the manner of the Greeks) the process of distinguishing between the common-sense elements of thought still goes on—as it ought to go on; for the part of wisdom seems to be not to abandon all distinctions that cannot be shown to be absolute, but rather to strengthen and emphasize these, always bearing in mind their relative nature.

This is in general the method pursued by Dr. Ladd in the series of books which he has written with the aim of answering four fundamental questions of human thought and life: the questions, What can I know? What ought I to do? What should I believe? and What may I hope? These books, intended as they are for popular reading, are to be described as works of edification rather than as treatises on psychology or metaphysics. In point of fact, they are both. A preacher who simply urged his hearers to be sincere, to be good, and to have faith in goodness, might do in a manner what Dr. Ladd has done. The difference between Dr. Ladd's analysis of fundamental questions and all ordinary forms of moral exhortation is, however, great enough to give the former a distinct and superior value. Taking as convenient starting points those ideas of knowledge, duty, belief and hope, which exist in every man's mind, Dr. Ladd analyzes them and traces them to their inner sources. In so doing he compels his readers to distinguish away the sophistries and obscurities which cling about the psychological or ethical notions of the untrained or lazy thinker. He presses his analysis, moreover, to the point at which it becomes fairly obvious that there must exist a basis in reality for our beliefs, our sense of duty, even for our less substantial hopes, always provided that these have their origin in reason as well as in desire.

The incorrigible metaphysicist will perhaps find this method unsatisfactory. It is not enough for him to be brought to the necessity of recognizing a basis of reality: he ardently longs to know just what the nature of this basis is. It would be, of course, mere impertinence to scorn the labor of the metaphysician who seeks to describe reality—even though his quest be indeed the traditional search "in a dark cellar for a black cat which does not exist." Dr. Ladd's investigations, too, are in their way metaphysical. But whatever the strict requirement of the searcher for the absolute, to most of us—humanly speaking—conviction is conviction. No one whose soul has been reached by Dr. Ladd's methods is likely to deny that he has a soul; no one who has succeeded in clarifying his thought through reason will be inclined to diverge from the path which reason clearly points out, even though it fails him before he reaches the goal.

Dr. Ladd's treatise upon hope is of somewhat fresher interest even than his works upon knowledge, belief, and duty, inasmuch as

the idea of hope has been less fully treated hitherto than the ideas which form the themes of the earlier books. In importance, this book, *What May I Hope?* proves scarcely inferior to any one of the other three. To be sure, most persons would promptly enough agree that hope ought to be both moral and reasonable—these are the author's fundamental contentions;—but there are few who could give any coherent account of the nature or justification of this readily assumed belief. Such an account Dr. Ladd supplies. Applying his tests to personal, social and scientific hopes, to the hope of moral perfection, the hope of immortality, and the hope of a divine kingdom, the author is highly successful in forcing his readers to recognize the fundamental psychological validity of morality and reason, and in enabling them to see to what extent these two elements may warrant the highest hopes. Taking broad and sympathetic views, the author finds use and justification not merely for the cautious hopes of the typically "reasonable" man but for the "hope too high for which we die" of the young and the enthusiastic.

AFFIRMATIONS. By Havelock Ellis. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.

What one wants and expects in a critic is first of all a man with a point of view both reasonably definite and reasonably liberal—a man, too, who applies his general ideas of life and literature to individual works with firmness but with due modesty and without pretense of absolute finality. Such a man is Havelock Ellis, whose book of critical essays, *Affirmations*, originally published in 1898, has been recently reissued—a recognition of its worth which it richly deserves.

Without attempting to distinguish closely between competing schools and methods, one may in fairness declare that Mr. Ellis is a representative modern critic—a highly successful practitioner of the art as it is now understood, so far as any common understanding in regard to it exists. In general, Mr. Ellis's point of view is humanistic and scientific. As he seeks to render this point of view more specific, it becomes usually psychological rather than ethical or philosophic. Mr. Ellis, however, keeps his fundamental beliefs well in check, confining their influence for the most part to the task of clarifying the particular subject in hand, seldom extending them in such a way as to bring into question the whole philosophy of life. Mr. Ellis is thus possessed of the necessary definiteness of standpoint; he shows sufficient liberality in the interpretation of life (for nothing human is excluded from his philosophy); and he is in general modest—as scientists are usually modest—in the broad application of his views. Occasionally, it is true, Mr. Ellis carries his scientific view considerably beyond the immediate critical purpose of the moment; and the old-fashioned reader gasps. "Be sure," writes the author, in his essay on Huysmans, "that Nature is your home and that from